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Abstract
We revisit the problem of solving two-player zero-
sum games in the decentralized setting. We pro-
pose a simple algorithmic framework that simulta-
neously achieves the best rates for honest regret as
well as adversarial regret, and in addition resolves
the open problem of removing the logarithmic
terms in convergence to the value of the game.
We achieve this goal in three steps. First, we
provide a novel analysis of the optimistic mirror
descent (OMD), showing that it can be modified
to guarantee fast convergence for both honest re-
gret and value of the game, when the players are
playing collaboratively. Second, we propose a
new algorithm, dubbed as robust optimistic mir-
ror descent (ROMD), which attains optimal ad-
versarial regret without knowing the time horizon
beforehand. Finally, we propose a simple signal-
ing scheme, which enables us to bridge OMD
and ROMD to achieve the best of both worlds.
Numerical examples are presented to support our
theoretical claims and show that our non-adaptive
ROMD algorithm can be competitive to OMD
with adaptive step-size selection.
1. Introduction
The simple zero-sum games have been studied extensively,
often from the standpoint of analyzing the convergence to
the Nash equilibrium. At the equilibrium, the players em-
ploy a min-max pair of strategies where no player can im-
prove their pay-off by a unilateral deviation (Von Neumann,
1928).
In this setting, one can expect that the players arrive at the
equilibrium via decentralized, no-regret learning algorithms,
which hold even in the presence of potential adversarial
behavior, and which also better model selfish play. The
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resulting dynamics is of great interest in optimization and
behavioral economics (Myerson, 1999), especially under
communication constraints.
When the behavior of each player is explained by a no-
regret algorithm, it is possible to significantly improve con-
vergence rates beyond the so-called black-box, adversarial
dynamics. This observation was first made by (Daskalakis
et al., 2011), which tailored a decentralized version of Nes-
terov’s primal-dual method based on the excessive gap con-
dition.
Intriguingly, (Daskalakis et al., 2011) left it as an open ques-
tion on the existence of a simple algorithm that converges
at optimal rates for both regret and the value of the game in
an uncoupled manner, both against honest (i.e., cooperative)
and dishonest (i.e., arbitrarily adversarial) behavior.
The challenge was partially settled by the modified opti-
mistic mirror descent (OMD) framework in (Rakhlin &
Sridharan, 2013b). While the framework of (Daskalakis
et al., 2011) is considered unnatural and involves additional
logarithmic factors, similar arguments apply to Rakhlin &
Sridharan (2013b)’s framework: The modified OMD needs
to know the game horizon a priori to determine the step-
sizes. Their analysis also results in non-optimal regret and
logarithmic factors in convergence to the value of the game.
Besides the aforementioned drawbacks, neither approaches
can accommodate natural switches between honest and dis-
honest behavior.
In this work, we propose a simple algorithmic framework
that closes the gap between upper and lower bounds for
adversarial regret as well as convergence to the value of
the game, while maintaining the best known rate for hon-
est regret, thereby resolving the open problem posed by
(Daskalakis et al., 2011).
We achieve the desiderata as follows: First, we provide a
novel analysis of OMD and show that it can obtain fast
convergence for both honest regret and value of the game,
when both players are honest. Second, we introduce robust
optimistic mirror descent (ROMD), which attains optimal
adversarial regret without knowing the time horizon. Finally,
we propose a simple signaling scheme, which enables us to
bridge OMD and ROMD to achieve the best of both worlds,
and seamlessly handle honest and dishonest behavior.
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Honest RT Adversarial RT Game Value Oracle Algorithm
Daskalakis et al. (2011) O(log T ) O(
√
T ) O(T−1log
3
2 T ) |A|max Complicated
Rakhlin & Sridharan (2013b) ? O(
√
T log T ) O
(
T−1log T
)
T, |A|max Simple
This paper O(log T ) O(
√
T ) O
(
T−1
) |A|max Simple
Table 1. A convergence rate comparison in the context of assumptions.
1.1. Related Work
Algorithms for Decentralized Games: To our knowledge,
the only two explicit algorithms capable of solving zero-sum
games in the decentralized setting are given by (Daskalakis
et al., 2011) and (Rakhlin & Sridharan, 2013b), respectively.
A comparison of their convergence rates versus ours is pre-
sented in Table 1.
The algorithm of (Daskalakis et al., 2011) is a decentral-
ized primal-dual method based on Nesterov’s excessive gap
technique (Nesterov, 2005). Its convergence guarantees are
only slightly worse than ours (cf., Table 1). However, due to
the presence of complicated and unnatural scheduling steps,
the authors in (Daskalakis et al., 2011) themselves were not
convinced by the practicality of their algorithm and stated
the result as merely an “existence proof.”
Later on, Rakhlin & Sridharan (2013b) proposed an al-
gorithm based on the Optimistic Mirror Descent (OMD),
initially introduced in a special case by (Chiang et al., 2012)
and also studied in detail by (Rakhlin & Sridharan, 2013a).
While the algorithm is simple, it features several drawbacks.
Foremost, it requires the time horizon beforehand, which
is unsatisfactory. Second, when both players are playing
collaboratively, their regret is sub-optimal. Third, its adver-
sarial regret and convergence to the game value has extra
log T factors, which require additional cautions to remove.
Finally, the algorithm uses adaptive step-sizes, requiring
additional work per-iteration.
Meta-Algorithms: There exist some work on “meta-
algorithms” for games (Syrgkanis et al., 2015; Foster et al.,
2016), which can turn certain learning algorithms into solv-
ing zero-sum games. For instance, leveraging the framework
in (Syrgkanis et al., 2015), one can modify OMD to achieve
O(T
1
4 ) for honest regret + O˜
(√
T
)
for adversarial regret.
Our algorithm uniformly outperforms these rates.
2. Preliminaries and Notation
Let ψ be a mirror map over the convex domain D, and
let D(·, ·) be the Bregman divergence associated with ψ.
We assume the knowledge of the three-point identity for
Bregman divergence in the sequel:
D(x,y)+D(y, z) = D(x, z)+〈x− y,∇ψ(z)−∇ψ(y)〉 .
We use the notation z = MDη(x,g) to denote:
z = ∇ψ?
(
∇ψ(x)− ηg
)
where ψ? is the Fenchel dual of ψ.
Let ψ be 1-strongly convex with respect to the norm ‖ · ‖.
We define
D2 := max
{
sup
x,x′∈D
1
2
‖x− x′‖2, sup
x∈D
D(x,xc)
}
where xc := arg minx∈D ψ(x) is the prox center. Hence
D controls both the diameter (in ‖ · ‖) and the Bregman
divergence to the prox center.
We frequently use the fact that
〈x, Ay〉 ≤ |A|max ∀x ∈ ∆m, y ∈ ∆n
where |A|max is the maximum entry of A in absolute value,
and ∆m := {x ∈ Rm |
∑m
i=1 xi = 1, xi ≥ 0} is the
standard simplex. On a simplex, we will only consider the
entropic mirror map:
ψ(x) =
k∑
i=1
xi log xi, k = m or n
which is well-known to be 1-strongly convex in ‖ · ‖1.
We use 1m1m to denote the uniform distribution on ∆m.
3. Problem Formulation and Main Result
An (offline) two-player zero-sum game with payoff matrix
A refers to the solving the minimax problem:
V := min
y∈∆n
max
x∈∆m
〈x, Ay〉 . (1)
The quantity V in (1) is called the value of the game, or the
Nash Equilibrium Value. Any pair (x¯, y¯) attaining the game
value is called an equilibrium strategy.
In the decentralized setting (aka., the “strongly uncoupled”
setting), the payoff matrix and the number of opponent’s
strategies are unknown to both players, and their goal is to
learn a pair of equilibrium strategy through repeated game
plays. Moreover, each player aims to suffer a low individual
regret, even in the presence of an adversary or a corrupted
channel that distorts the feedback.
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Specifically, at each round t, the players take actions xt and
yt, and then receive the loss vectors −Ayt (for x-player)
and A>xt (for y-player). In the honest setting, we assume
that the two players take actions according to a prescribed
algorithm, and we say the setting is adversarial if only one
player (the x-player in this paper) adheres to the prescribed
algorithm and the other player arbitrary.
As in previous work, we assume that an upper bound |A|max
on the maximum absolute entry of A is available to both
players. The goal is to achieve
|V − 〈xT , AyT 〉| ≤ r1(T ),
RT := max
x∈∆m
T∑
t=1
〈xt − x,−Ayt〉 ≤ r2(T )
for fast-decaying r1 and sublinear r2 in T . The first require-
ment is to approximate the game value in (1), and the second
one asks to minimize the regret RT .
Our main result can be stated as follows:
Theorem 1 (Main result, informal). For (1), there is a sim-
ple decentralized algorithm with non-adaptive step-size such
that
r1(T ) = O
(
1
T
)
, r2(T ) = O (log T ) ,
if the opponent is honest (i.e., playing collaboratively to
solve the game). Moreover, against any adversary, we have
r2(T ) = O
(√
T
)
.
Except for theO (log T ) honest regret, these rates are known
to be optimal (Cesa-Bianchi & Lugosi, 2006; Daskalakis
et al., 2015). We are also the first to remove log T factors
in convergence to the value of the game, an open question
posed by the very first work in learning decentralized games
(Daskalakis et al., 2011).
4. A family of optimistic mirror descents:
Classical, Robust, and Let’s be honest
We first illustrate the high-level ideas to prove Theorem
1 in Section 4.1. A novel analysis for OMD in the honest
setting is given in Section 4.2, and we propose a new algo-
rithm for the adversarial setting in Section 4.3. Finally, the
full algorithm is presented in Section 4.4, along with the
rigorous version of the main result (cf., Theorem 4).
4.1. High-Level Ideas
Our algorithms are inspired by the iterates of the form:{
xt+1 = MDη(xt,−2Ayt +Ayt−1)
yt+1 = MDη(yt, 2A
>xt −A>xt−1) , (2)
which are equivalent to the OMD in (Rakhlin & Sridharan,
2013b) (see Appendix A). It is known that directly apply-
ing (2) to (1) yields O
(
1
T
)
convergence in the game value,
however without any guarantee on the regret.
To make OMD optimal for zero-sum games, we improve
(2) on two fronts. First, in the honest setting, we make
the following simple observation: Although the iterates xt
are not guaranteed to possess sublinear regret, the averaged
iterates 1t
∑t
i=1 xi do enjoy logarithmic regret, and hence,
it suffices to play the averaged iterates in the honest setting.
Second, in order to make OMD robust against any adver-
sary, we utilize the “mixing steps” of (Rakhlin & Sridharan,
2013b) with an important improvement: Our step-sizes do
not depend on the time horizon. This new feature is crucial
in removing log T factors in both the convergence to game
value and adversarial regret. In fact, our analysis is arguably
simpler than (Rakhlin & Sridharan, 2013b).
4.2. Optimistic Mirror Descent
Algorithm 1 Optimistic Mirror Descent: x-Player
Set η = 12|A|max
Play z1 = z2 = z3 = 1m1m
For t ≥ 3:
1: Compute
xt+1 = MDη(xt,−2(t− 2)Awt
+ 3(t− 3)Awt−1 − (t− 4)Awt−2)
2: Play zt+1 = 1t−1
∑t+1
i=3 xi
3: Observe −Awt+1
Algorithm 2 Optimistic Mirror Descent: y-Player
Set η = 12|A|max
Play w1 = w2 = w3 = 1n1n
For t ≥ 3:
1: Compute
yt+1 = MDη(yt, 2(t− 2)A>zt
− 3(t− 3)A>zt−1 + (t− 4)A>zt−2)
2: Play wt+1 = 1t−1
∑t+1
i=3 yi
3: Observe A>zt+1
As alluded to in Section 4.1, we will play OMD with the
averaged iterates. The algorithms are given explicitly in
Algorithm 1 and 2.
Remark 1. Note that there is no need to play 1m1m and
1
n1n three times in Algorithm 1 and 2. The players could
just play once
(
1
m1m
)>
A
(
1
n1n
)
and would have enough
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information to run OMD from x4 and y4. Our choices are
motivated by the resulting ease of the notation.
We analyze our version of OMD below. The crux of our
analysis is to first look at the regrets of auxiliary sequences
xt and yt, and we show that the sum of the auxiliary regrets,
not any individual of them, controls both the convergence to
the value of the game and the honest regret for the averaged
sequences zt and wt.
Theorem 2. Suppose two players of a zero-sum game have
played T rounds according to the OMD algorithm with
η = 12|A|max . Then
1. The x-player suffers an O (log T ) regret:
max
z∈∆m
T∑
t=3
〈zt − z,−Awt〉 ≤ log 2(T − 2)|A|max ×(
20 + logm+ log n
)
(3)
= O (log T )
and similarly for the y-player.
2. The strategies (zT ,wT ) constitutes an O
(
1
T
)
-
approximate equilibrium to the value of the game:
|V − 〈zT , AwT 〉| ≤
(
20 + logm+ log n
)
|A|max
T − 2
(4)
= O
(
1
T
)
.
Proof. See Appendix B.
4.3. Robust Optimistic Mirror Descent
In this section, we introduce robust optimistic mirror de-
scent (ROMD), which is a novel algorithm even for online
convex optimization.
Let ψ be 1-strongly convex with respect to ‖·‖, and suppose
we are minimizing the regret against an arbitrary sequence
of convex functions f1, f2, . . . in a constraint setD. Assume
that each function is G-Lipschitz in ‖ · ‖. Assume also that
no Bregman projection is needed (i.e., MDη(x,g) ∈ D for
any x and g); this is, for instance, the case for the entropic
mirror map.
We state ROMD in the general form in Algorithm 3.
Theorem 3 (O(
√
T )-Adversarial Regret). Suppose that
‖∇ft‖∗ ≤ G for all t. Then playing T rounds of Algo-
rithm 3 with ηt = 1G√t against an arbitrary sequence of
convex functions has the following guarantee on the regret:
max
x∈∆m
T∑
t=1
〈xt − x,∇ft(xt)〉 ≤ G
√
T
(
18 + 2D2
)
+GD
(
3
√
2 + 4D
)
= O
(√
T
)
.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Algorithm 3 Robust Optimistic Mirror Descent
1: Initialize x1 = xc,∇f0 = 0, ηt = 1G√t
2: for t = 1, 2, ..., do
3: x˜t = (
t−1
t )xt +
1
txc
4: Set ∇˜t = 2∇ft(xt)−∇ft−1(xt−1),
play xt+1 = MDηt(x˜t, ∇˜t)
5: Observe ft+1
6: end for
When specialized to zero-sum games, it suffices to take
xc =
1
m1m, G = |A|max, D = logm, and ψ being the
entropic mirror map.
Remark 2. Our analysis of ROMD crucially relies on the
assumption that no Bregman projection is needed. We have
not been able to generalize our analysis to the case with
Bregman projections.
4.4. Let’s be honest: The full framework
We now present our approach for solving (1).
To ease the notation, define
z∗t := arg min
x∈∆m
〈x,−Awt〉
and
w∗t = arg min
y∈∆n
〈zt, Ay〉 .
Let constants C1, C2, and C3 be such that (see Thereom 2,
Theorem 3, and (B.10))
〈zt − z∗t ,−Awt〉 ≤
C1
t
, zt,wt from OMD, (5)〈
wt −w∗t , A>zt
〉 ≤ C1
t
, zt,wt from OMD, (6)
T∑
t=1
〈zt − z∗,−Ayt〉 ≤ C2
√
T , zt from ROMD and
yt arbitrary, (7)
|V − zTAwT | ≤ C3
T
, zT ,wT from OMD. (8)
From a high-level, our approach exploits the following sim-
ple observation: Suppose that we know C1 above. If the
Let’s be Honest: An Optimal No-Regret Framework for Zero-Sum Games
Algorithm 4 Let’s Be Honest Optimistic Mirror Descent:
x-Player
1: Initialize b = 1, t = 1,w0 = 1n1n and z0 =
1
m1m
2: Play t-th round of OMD-x, observe −Apt
3:
4: if Gwt :=
〈
wt−1, A>zt−1
〉 − 〈pt, A>zt−1〉 > bt−1
then
5: Play b4 − 1 rounds of ROMD
6: t← t+ 1
7: b← 2b
8: Go to line 2.
9: end if
10: −Awt ← −Apt
11:
12: if Gzt := 〈zt,−Awt〉 − 〈z∗t ,−Awt〉 > bt then
13: Play xˇt+1 := z∗t
14: Play b4 − 1 rounds of ROMD
15: t← t+ 2
16: b← 2b
17: Go to line 2.
18: end if
19: t← t+ 1
20: Go to line 2.
instantaneous regret bound (5) and (6) hold true for all t,
then we would trivially have the desired convergence.
In contrast, if at any round the bound (5) is violated for the
x-player, then it must be due to an adversarial play, and we
can simply switch to ROMD to getO(
√
T ) regret. However,
since C1 (cf., (B.10)) involves n, the number of opponent’s
strategies, the x-player cannot compute it exactly. The
situation is similar for the y-player. We hence need to come
up with a way to estimate C1 for both players.
It is important to note that one can not naïvely estimate C1
by binary search separately on both players. The reason, and
the major difficultly to the above approach, is as follows:
Since in general 〈zt − z∗t ,−Awt〉 6=
〈
wt −w∗t , A>zt
〉
, it
could be the case that, at the same round, the x-player de-
tects a bad instantaneous regret and switch to ROMD, while
the y-player remains in OMD, even though two players are
both honest. However, our entire analysis of OMD would
breakdown if the OMD is not played cohesively.
Furthermore, recall that we also want robustness against any
adversary. Therefore, a bad instantaneous regret indicates
the possibility of receiving an adversarial play, and we need
to switch to ROMD whenever this occurs.
To resolve such issues, we devise a simple signaling scheme
(xˇt and yˇt below), which synchronizes both players’ C1
estimate and also the OMD plays while guaranteeing robust-
ness.
Algorithm 5 Let’s Be Honest Optimistic Mirror Descent:
y-Player
1: Initialize b = 1, t = 1,w0 = 1n1n and z0 =
1
m1m
2: Play t-th round of OMD-y, observe A>ot
3:
4: if Gzt := 〈zt−1,−Awt−1〉 − 〈ot,−Awt−1〉 > bt−1
then
5: Play b4 − 1 rounds of ROMD
6: t← t+ 1
7: b← 2b
8: Go to line 2.
9: end if
10: Azt ← A>ot
11:
12: if Gwt :=
〈
wt, A
>zt
〉− 〈w∗t , A>zt〉 > bt then
13: Play yˇt+1 := w∗t
14: Play b4 − 1 rounds of ROMD
15: t← t+ 2
16: b← 2b
17: Go to line 2.
18: end if
19: t← t+ 1
20: Go to line 2.
In words, our signaling scheme is a “Let’s be honest” mes-
sage to the opponent: “I am having a bad instantaneous
regret. Please update your C1 with me, and please pretend
that I am adversarial for a small number of rounds, so that
we can play honest OMD cohesively.” It turns out that doing
these extra signaling rounds do not hurt the convergence
rates in OMD and ROMD at all.
Our full algorithm, termed Let’s Be Honest (LbH) Opti-
mistic Mirror Descent, is presented in Algorithm 4 and
5.
Remark 3. In Algorithm 4 and 5, the role of b is to estimate
the constant C1 in (5). Since our analysis requires b to be
the same for both players throughout the algorithm run, a
simple way is to assume that, say, m = n = 5, compute
the corresponding C˜1, and set the initial b ← C˜1. Doing
so indeed improves upon constants in our convergence; we
chose b = 1 only for simplicity.
Remark 4. There are some degree of freedom in Algorithm
4 and 5. For instance, instead of doubling b in Line 16, one
can do b ← (1 + )b for some  > 0. In Line 5, one
can also play b2 − 1 rounds, rather than b4 − 1. As will
become apparent in Theorem 4, these variants only effect
the constants but not the convergence rates. However, they
do have impact on empirical performance; cf., Section 5.
The following key lemma ensures the two players to enter
the ROMD plays coherently.
Lemma 1. If the y-player enters Line 12 of Algorithm 5 at
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the t-th round, then the x-player enters Line 4 of Algorithm
4 at the (t + 1)-th round. Conversely, if, at the t-th round,
the y-player does not enter Line 12 of Algorithm 5, then
the x-player does not enter Line 4 of Algorithm 4 at the
(t+ 1)-th round.
Exactly the same statements hold when the x- and y-player
are reversed above.
Proof. If the y-player enters Line 12 of Algorithm 5 at the
t-th round, then yˇt+1 is signalled at the (t+1)-th round, and
it must be the case that
〈
wt −w∗t , A>zt
〉
> bt (cf., Line
12 of Algorithm 5). Therefore, at the (t+ 1)-th round, the
x-player would receive −Ayˇt+1 = −Aw∗t and compute
Gwt+1 =
〈
wt, A
>zt
〉− 〈yˇt+1, A>zt〉
=
〈
wt −w∗t , A>zt
〉
>
b
t
which then enters the Line 4 of Algorithm 4.
Conversely, suppose that the y-player does not enter Line
12 of Algorithm 5 at the t-th round (or, equivalently, plays
OMD at the (t+1)-th round). Then
〈
wt −w∗t , A>zt
〉 ≤ bt ,
implying that
Gwt+1 =
〈
wt −wt+1, A>zt
〉
≤ 〈wt −w∗t , A>zt〉 ≤ bt
hence preventing the x-player from entering Line 4 of Al-
gorithm 4.
Exactly the same computation holds when we reverse the
role of x- and y-player.
Given Lemma 1, we now know that the x-player switches
to ROMD if and only if the y-player does. The rest of the
proof then readily follows from Theorems 2 and 3.
Theorem 4. Suppose the x-player plays according to Algo-
rithm 4 for T rounds, and let RT be the regret up to time T .
Then
1. Let T = T1 +T2 +T3 where T1 is the number of OMD
plays, T2 is the number of ROMD plays, and T3 is the
number of signaling rounds (playing xˇt or yˇt). Then
there are constants C and C ′, depending only onm,n
and |A|max, such that
1
T
RT ≤ C log T1 + C
′√T2
T1 + T2
. (9)
In particular, if the opponent plays honestly, then RT =
O(log T1) = O(log T ). If the opponent is adversarial,
we have RT = O(
√
T2) = O(
√
T ).
2. Suppose that the honest y-player plays Algorithm
5. Then the pair (zT ,wT ) constitutes an O
(
1
T
)
-
approximate equilibrium:
|V − 〈zT , AwT 〉 | ≤ C
′′
T
(10)
for some constant C ′′.
Proof. Suppose first that both players are honest.
We first prove the individual regret for the x-player. We
split the terms as follows:
RT = RT1(playing OMD) + RT2(playing ROMD)
+ RT3(signaling). (11)
Recall (5)-(8). We claim that
(a) T3 ≤ dlogC1e.
(b) T2 ≤ 16 · 16T3−1−115 := C ′1.
Indeed, after dlogC1e-times signaling, we would have b =
2T3 > C1. Then (5) and (6) imply that we will never enter
Line 12 again. On the other hand, we have
T2 ≤
T3∑
r=1
24r =
16T3−1 − 1
15
.
Combining (a), (b) and using (5), (7) in (11), we conclude
that
RT ≤ C1 log T1 + C2
√
T2 + 2|A|maxT3
≤ C1 log T1 + C2
√
C ′1 + 2|A|maxdlogC1e
= O(log T1) = O(log T )
which establishes (9) in the honest case.
For convergence to the value of the game, we have, by (8),
|V − 〈zT , AwT 〉 | ≤ C3
T − T2 − T3 ≤
C3
T − C∗
where C∗ = dlogC1e+C ′1. The proof of (10) is completed
by using the fact that 1T−C∗ ≤ C
∗
T when T ≥ C
∗2
C∗−1 .
Finally, we show (9) in the adversarial case.
Let T1, T2, and T3 be as before, and we again split the regret
into:
RT = RT1(playing OMD) + RT2(playing ROMD)
+ RT3(signaling).
Notice that this time the inequalities (5) and (6) do not apply
since the opponent no longer plays OMD collaboratively.
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Figure 1. Honest setting.
However, by Line 12 of Algorithm 4, for every OMD play
we must have
〈zt,−Awt〉 − 〈z∗t ,−Awt〉 ≤
b
t
≤ 2
T3
t
.
Following the analysis as in the honest setting, we may
further write
RT ≤ 2T3 log T1 + C2
√
T2 + 2|A|maxT3.
It hence suffices to show that
2T3 log T1 ≤ C∗∗
√
T1 + T2. (12)
for some constant C∗∗. To see (12), recall that
T2 =
16(16T3 − 1)
15
≥ 16T3−1.
But then
2T3 log T1√
T1 + T2
≤ 2
T3 log T1√
2
√
T1T2
≤ 2
T3 log T1
2T3−1 · √2 · 4√T1
≤ C∗∗.
for some universal constant C∗∗.
Remark 5. As is evident from the proof, we have made no
attempt to sharpening the constants, and hence our bounds
can be numerically loose.
5. Experiments
The purpose of this section is to provide numerical evidence
to the following claims of our theory:
1. The LbH algorithm does not require knowing the
time horizon beforehand, and our step-sizes are non-
adaptive. Therefore, all quantities of interest, such as
regrets or game value, should steadily decrease along
the algorithm run.
2. The LbH algorithm automatically adjusts to honest and
adversarial opponents.
For comparison, we include the modified OMD (henceforth
abbreviated as m-OMD) of (Rakhlin & Sridharan, 2013b)
in our experiment, for different choices of time horizon.
We generate the entries of A uniformly at random in the
interval [−1, 1], and we set m = 200 and n = 300.
We consider two scenarios:
1. Honest setting: Both players adhere to the prescribed
algorithms and try to reach the Nash equilibrium col-
laboratively.
2. Adversarial setting: The y-player greedily maximizes
the instantaneous regret of the x-player.
5.1. Honest Setting
The convergence for the honest setting is reported in Figure
1, for two different parameter choices of LbH and m-OMD.
For both convergence to the game value and individual
regret, after a short burn-in period (due to not knowing the
C1 in (5) and (6)), the LbH algorithm enters a steadyO
(
1
T
)
-
decreasing phase, as expected from our theory. On the other
hand, as the m-OMD chooses step-sizes according to the
time horizon, it eventually saturates in both plots.
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Figure 2. Adversarial setting.
As noted by (Rakhlin & Sridharan, 2013b), it is possible
to prevent the saturation of m-OMD by employing the dou-
bling trick or the techniques in (Auer et al., 2002). However,
doing so not only complicates the algorithm, but also intro-
duces extra log T factors in the convergence of honest regret,
since the doubling trick loses a log T factor for logarithmic
regrets. Such rates are sub-optimal given our results.
5.2. Adversarial Setting
We report the regret comparison in Figure 2.
In the adversarial setting, the LbH algorithm is essentially
running the ROMD, and hence we see a straight O(T−
1
2 )
decrease in the regret, as dictated by our upper bound in
Theorem 3; see Figure 2-(b). The parameter choice does
not effect the performance.
The m-OMD slightly outperforms LbH for a short period,
but eventually blows up in regret. We remark that the short-
term good empirical performance is due to the adaptive
step-sizes of m-OMD, which require additional work per-
iteration. Our LbH algorithm is non-adaptive, but is already
competitive in terms of empirical performance.
6. Conclusion and Future Work
We studied the problem of zero-sum games in the decentral-
ized setting, and we resolved an open problem of achieving
optimal convergence to the game value while maintaining
low regrets. Our techniques were based on several sim-
ple but novel observations in the game dynamics. Namely,
we noticed that the averaged iterates of OMD enjoy loga-
rithmic regret in the honest setting, we provided horizon-
independent mixing steps for the OMD to achieve optimal
adversarial regret, and we designed a singaling scheme to
losslessly bridge OMD and ROMD. In essence, we showed
that it is not necessary, as done in the work of (Rakhlin &
Sridharan, 2013b), to fix the time horizon beforehand and
modify OMD accordingly. Our observations were instru-
mental in removing log T terms in all convergence rates.
Our framework suggests several research directions. First,
instead of assuming that we observe the full loss vector, we
may pose our problem in the bandit setting, where only the
payoff value of the current strategy is observed. Second,
for practical purposes, it is interesting to see whether there
exists an adaptive step-size version of our algorithm. Fi-
nally, generalizing our framework to multiplayer games is a
challenging future work.
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Appendix
A. Equivalence Formulations of Optimistic Mirror Descent
In this appendix, we show that the xt iterates in (2) of the main text is equivalent to the following iterates given in (Chiang
et al., 2012; Rakhlin & Sridharan, 2013a): {
xt = MDη (x˜t,−Ayt−1)
x˜t+1 = MDη (x˜t,−Ayt) . (A.1)
By the optimality condition for (A.1), we have
∇ψ(xt) = ∇ψ(x˜t)− η (−Ayt−1) , (A.2)
∇ψ(x˜t) = ∇ψ(x˜t−1)− η (−Ayt−1) , (A.3)
∇ψ(x˜t−1) = ∇ψ(xt−1) + η (−Ayt−2) . (A.4)
We hence get (2) by applying (A.4) to (A.3) and then (A.3) to (A.2).
B. Optimistic Mirror Descent
In this appendix, we prove Theorem 2, restated below for convenience.
Theorem 5. Suppose two players of a zero-sum game have played T rounds according to Algorithm 1 and 2 with
η = 12|A|max . Then
1. The x-player suffers a O
(
log(T )
T
)
regret:
max
z∈∆m
T∑
t=3
〈zt − z,−Awt〉 ≤
(
log(T − 2) + 1
)(
20 + logm+ log n
)
|A|max (B.1)
= O (log T )
and similarly for the y-player.
2. The strategies (zT ,wT ) constitutes an O
(
1
T
)
-approximate equilibrium to the value of the game:
|V − 〈zT , AwT 〉| ≤
(
20 + logm+ log n
)
|A|max
T − 2 = O
(
1
T
)
. (B.2)
Proof. Define x∗ as
x∗ = arg min
x∈∆m
〈
x,−A
(
1
T − 2
T∑
t=3
yt
)〉
. (B.3)
We define an auxiliary individual regret RxT as
RxT :=
T∑
t=3
〈xt − x∗,−Ayt〉. (B.4)
Notice that this is the regret on the xt sequence versus yt sequence, while we are playing zt’s and wt’s in the algorithm.
We then have
RxT =
T∑
t=3
〈xt − x∗,−Ayt〉
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= 〈x3 − x∗,−Ay3〉+
T∑
t=4
〈xt − x∗,−Ayt〉
≤ 2|A|max +
T∑
t=4
〈xt − x∗,−Ayt − gt−1〉+
T∑
t=4
〈xt − x∗,gt−1〉
where gt := −2(t− 2)Awt + 3(t− 3)Awt−1 − (t− 4)Awt−2. Inserting wt = 1t−2
∑t
i=3 yi into the definition of gt, we
get gt = −2Ayt +Ayt−1. Straightforward calculation then shows:
RxT ≤ 2|A|max +
T∑
t=4
〈xt − x∗,−Ayt + 2Ayt−1 −Ayt−2〉+
T∑
t=4
〈xt − x∗,−2Ayt−1 +Ayt−2〉
= 2|A|max +
T∑
t=4
〈xt − x∗, (−Ayt +Ayt−1)− (−Ayt−1 +Ayt−2)〉
+
1
η
T∑
t=4
(
D(x∗,xt−1)−D(x∗,xt)−D(xt,xt−1)
)
= 2|A|max +
T−1∑
t=4
〈xt − xt+1,−Ayt +Ayt−1〉+ 〈x4 − x∗, Ay3 −Ay2〉
+ 〈xT − x∗,−AyT +AyT−1〉+ 1
η
T∑
t=4
(
D(x∗,xt−1)−D(x∗,xt)−D(xt,xt−1)
)
≤ 10|A|max +
T−1∑
t=4
〈xt − xt+1,−Ayt +Ayt−1〉
+
1
η
T∑
t=4
(
D(x∗,xt−1)−D(x∗,xt)−D(xt,xt−1)
)
≤ 10|A|max +
T−1∑
t=4
‖xt − xt+1‖1 · |A|max · ‖yt − yt−1‖1
+
1
η
(
D(x∗,x3)−D(x∗,xT )
)
+
T∑
t=4
−1
η
D(xt,xt−1)
≤ 10|A|max + 1
2
T−1∑
t=4
(
|A|max · ‖xt − xt+1‖21 + |A|max · ‖yt − yt−1‖21
)
+
1
η
(
D(x∗,x3)−D(x∗,xT )
)
+
T∑
t=4
−1
η
D(xt,xt−1).
Using the fact that ψ is 1-strongly convex with respect to the `1-norm, we have −D(x,x′) ≤ − 12‖x− x′‖21 ≤ 0. Also, we
have D(x∗,x3) ≤ logm. Combining these facts in the last inequality gives:
RxT ≤ 10|A|max +
logm
η
+
|A|max
2
T−1∑
t=4
‖xt − xt+1‖21
+
|A|max
2
T−1∑
t=4
‖yt − yt−1‖21 −
1
2η
T∑
t=4
‖xt−1 − xt‖21.
Similarly, for the second player we define
RyT :=
T∑
t=3
〈
yt − y∗, A>xt
〉
(B.5)
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where y∗ := arg miny
〈
y, A>
(
1
T−2
∑T
t=3 xt
)〉
. We then have
RyT ≤ 10|A|max +
log n
η
+
|A|max
2
T−1∑
t=4
‖yt − yt+1‖21
+
|A|max
2
T−1∑
t=4
‖xt − xt−1‖21 −
1
2η
T∑
t=4
‖yt−1 − yt‖21.
Setting η = 12|A|max , we get
RxT + R
y
T ≤
(
20 + logm+ log n
)
|A|max. (B.6)
Now, recalling that zT =
∑T
t=3 xt
T−2 and wT =
∑T
t=3 yt
T−2 and using the definition of R
x
T and R
y
T , we get
1
T − 2
(
RxT + R
y
T
)
= max
x∈∆m
〈x, AwT 〉 − min
y∈∆n
〈zT , Ay〉 . (B.7)
Furthermore, by the definition of the value of the game, we have
min
y∈∆n
〈zT , Ay〉 ≤ V ≤ max
x∈∆m
〈x, AwT 〉 . (B.8)
We also trivially have
min
y∈∆n
〈zT , Ay〉 ≤ 〈zT , AwT 〉 ≤ max
x∈∆m
〈x, AwT 〉 . (B.9)
Combining (B.7) - (B.9) in (B.6) then establishes (4):
|V − 〈zT , AwT 〉| ≤
(
20 + logm+ log n
)
|A|max
T − 2 .
We now turn to (3).
Let RzT := maxz∈∆m
∑T
t=3 〈zt − z,−Awt〉 and let R˜
z
T :=
∑T
t=3 〈zt − z∗t ,−Awt〉 where z∗t = arg minz∈∆m 〈z,−Awt〉.
Evidently we have RzT ≤ R˜
z
T . Notice that (with w
∗
t similarly defined)
〈zt − z∗t ,−Awt〉 = 〈z∗t , Awt〉 − 〈zt, Awt〉
≤ 〈z∗t , Awt〉 − 〈zt, Aw∗t 〉
≤
(
20 + logm+ log n
)
|A|max
t− 2 (B.10)
by (B.6) and (B.7). Using these inequalities, we get
1
T − 2R
z
T ≤
1
T − 2 R˜
z
T =
1
T − 2
T∑
t=3
〈zt − z∗t ,−Awt〉
≤ 1
T − 2
T∑
t=3
(
20 + logm+ log n
)
|A|max
t− 2
≤
(
log(T − 2) + 1
)(
20 + logm+ log n
)
|A|max
T − 2
which finishes the proof.
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C. Robust Optimistic Mirror Descent
In this appendix, we prove Theorem 3, repeated below for convenience.
Theorem 6 (O(
√
T )-Adversarial Regret). Suppose that ‖∇ft‖∗ ≤ G for all t. Then playing T rounds of Algorithm 3 with
ηt =
1
G
√
t
against an arbitrary sequence of convex functions has the following guarantee on the regret:
max
x∈∆m
T∑
t=1
〈xt − x,∇ft(xt)〉 ≤ G
√
T
(
18 + 2D2
)
+GD
(
3
√
2 + 4D
)
= O
(√
T
)
.
Proof. Define RxT :=
∑T
t=1 〈xt − x∗,∇ft(xt)〉 where x∗ := arg minx∈∆m
〈
x,
∑T
t=1∇ft(xt)
〉
. Let ∇˜t = 2∇ft(xt)−
∇ft−1(xt−1), and let ηt = 1α√t for some α > 0 to be chosen later. Then
RxT =
T∑
t=1
〈xt − x∗,∇ft(xt)〉
≤
√
2DG+
T∑
t=2
〈xt − x∗,∇ft(xt)− ∇˜t−1〉+
T∑
t=2
〈xt − x∗, ∇˜t−1〉
≤
√
2DG+
T∑
t=2
〈xt − x∗,∇ft(xt)−∇ft−1(xt−1)〉 −
T∑
t=2
〈xt − x∗,∇ft−1(xt−1)−∇ft−2(xt−2)〉+
T∑
t=2
〈xt − x∗, ∇˜t−1〉
≤ 3
√
2DG+
T−1∑
t=2
〈xt − xt+1,∇ft(xt)−∇ft−1(xt−1)〉+
T∑
t=2
1
ηt
(
D(x∗, x˜t−1)−D(x∗,xt)−D(xt, x˜t−1)
)
≤ 3
√
2DG+
T−1∑
t=2
(√
tG
9
‖xt − xt+1‖2 + 9G√
t
)
+ α
T∑
t=1
√
t
(
D(x∗, x˜t−1)−D(x∗,xt)−D(xt, x˜t−1)
)
.
Using the joint convexity of D(x,y) in x and y and the strong convexity of the entropic mirror map, we get:
−D(xt, x˜t−1) ≤ −1
2
‖x˜t − xt+1‖2
≤ −1
4
∥∥∥∥ t− 1t (xt − xt+1)
∥∥∥∥2 + 12
(
1
t
)2
‖xc − xt+1‖2
≤ − (t− 1)
2
4t2
‖xt − xt+1‖2 + D
2
t2
,
and
D(x∗, x˜t) ≤ t− 1
t
D(x∗,xt) +
1
t
D (x∗,xc) .
Meanwhile, straightforward calculations show that
T∑
t=2
D (x∗,xc)√
t
≤ 2D2
√
T ,
and
T∑
t=2
(√
t · t− 1
t
D(x∗,xt−1)−
√
tD(x∗,xt)
)
≤
T∑
t=2
(√
t− 1D(x∗,xt−1)−
√
tD(x∗,xt)
)
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≤ D(x∗,x1) ≤ D2.
We can hence continue as
RxT ≤ 3
√
2DG+
T−1∑
t=2
(√
t
9
G‖xt − xt+1‖2 + 9G√
t
)
+ 2αD2
√
T
+ αD2 − α
4
T∑
t=2
√
t ·
(
t− 1
t
)2
‖xt−1 − xt‖2 + αD2
T∑
t=2
√
t
t2
. (C.1)
Elementary calculations further show
T−1∑
t=2
9G√
t
≤ 18G
√
T ,
T∑
t=2
1
t
√
t
≤ 3.
Finally, since ( t−1t )
2 ≥ 49 for t ≥ 3, we can further bound (C.1) as
Rxt ≤ 3
√
2DG+ 18G
√
T + 2αD2
√
T + 4αD2
+
(
G
9
T−1∑
t=2
√
t‖xt − xt+1‖2 − α
4
· 4
9
T−1∑
t=2
√
t+ 1‖xt − xt+1‖2
)
.
The proof is finished by choosing α = G.
